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Abstract
We characterize the steady-state equilibrium in which informed traders
who exhibit heuristic (i.e. , representativeness, as opposed to Bayesian)
and Bayesian behaviors achieve the same expected utility. Then, we show
how the endogenous, steady-state proportion of heuristic traders is affected by the quality of public information and other exogenous features
of our model. Finally, we discuss how the presence of heuristic traders potentially alters the link between improved public disclosure and: market
liquidity, the variance in the change in price, and market efficiency.
The authors ackowledge the comments and suggestions from workshop
pa rticipants at the European Accounting Association meetings in Graz
(Austria) , Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Notre Dame University,
Odense University, and the University of Rochester.
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Introduction

A common assumption adopted in most models of securities trade is that traders form
beliefs using Bayes rule. The assumption of Ba yesian behavior, however, has been
called into question by a significant body of ex perimental evidence in the psychology literature (see Ka hneman, Slovic, and Tversky [1982]). In addition, the anomalies litera ture in accounting (see, for exa mple, Ou a nd Penman [1989] or Bernard
and Thomas [1990]) and finance (see, for example, De Bondt and Thaler [1985] or
Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter [1992]) contains findings tha t are also consistent with
the assertion tha t not all individuals are Bayesians . Nonetheless, Bayesian behavior
remains the pred ominant behavioral assumption because of the compelling argument
that Bayesian behavior should prevail in an evolutionary sense. 1 For example, unless
they lea rn to follow Bayes rule, heuristic equity fund managers should perform poorly
and be driven out of business .2
Recent resea rch, however, ha s shown that, in a setting with imperfect compet ition
among informed traders, informed heur·-istic traders who overreact to their private information are viable in an evolutionary sense because they achieve a higher ex pected
utility than informed Bayesian traders.:;

Heuristic traders who overreact to their

private information can achieve a higher expected utility because their overreaction
1 S~:---e Friedm an [1953] for an exam ple of an argument that rational behavior dominates in a n evolutionarv sen se.
2 In rC's ponse to the behavioral evidence just discussed, those who rely on the logic of the evolutionary
argun1fm t would assf~rt Umt experirne.ntal m arkets do not conhtin the appropriat.e evolution ary for ces
to drive o ut those who deviate from Bayesian beh avior. In response to t he anomolies literature, they
would argue tha t the experim ent al design s have not a ppropriately adj usted for risk. Fur thermore.
even if the a nomoly persists in the presen ce of an acceptable adj ustment for risk, they would argue
that the anomolies are due to some o ther economic friction.
;l S~:---e, for example, Kyle and Wang (1996] and Palomino (1996]. De Long, et al. (1990] consider the
viability of he uristic trade in a perfectly competitive market. T hey argue th at hueristic behavior is
viable be cause h euristic traders earn higher expected returns tha n Bayesian traders. As pointed out
by P alomino [1996], heuristic tra ders continue to h ave lower expected utilities in the Delong, e t al.
[1990] model, even tho ugh t hey have higher expected returns.
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induces them to trade more aggressively than Bayesian traders.

Such aggressive

behavior, in turn, a llows an informed trader who is heuristic to capture more information rents (i.e., achieve a higher expected utility) than an informed trader who is
Bayesian.
We build off of this ea rlier work by considering the role played by public disclosure
in a trading model with two types of informed traders, heuristic (i.e., those who
overreact) and Bayesian. We undertake this ex tension of the earlier work for two
reasons . First, we are interested in the effect of public disclosure on the viability of
heuristic trade. Specifically, does improved disclosure work to drive heuristic trading
behavior from the market ? Second, we are interest ed in whether heuristic trading
alters previously established relations between disclosure levels a nd metrics commonly
employed to assess disclosure's economic impact: market liquidity, the variance of
price change coincident with the disclosure, and price efficiency. We acknowledge
that the introduction of heuristic behaviors could be exploited to generate a ll sorts of
results about the economic impact of disclosure. In this paper, however, we introduce
heuristic trade in a plausible manner by appealing to an evolutionary construct. By
making heuristic behavior plausible, our results concerning the economic impact of
disclosure in the presence of heuristic trade should be correspondingly plausible.
The model we employ is a standard Kyle [1985] model with the additional features of public disclosure of information and two types of identically informed traders :
heuristic traders who overreact to their current information a nd Bayesian traders. We
initially consider a static model in which the proportion of heuristic traders is exogenously fixed. In contrast to previous models in the literature, we then endogenize
the proportion of informed traders who are heuristic by employing a simple evolutionary dynamic that is based upon relative expected utilities. We assume that the
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population of informed traders shifts towards the type, Bayesian or heuristic, that
earns higher expected utility.'1

In our static model, heuristic traders achieve a level

of expected utility that exceeds the level of Bayesian traders, provided that there
are not too many of the former. Thus, our evolutionary dynamic implies that, when
the number of heuristic traders is small their proportion of the population grows ,
and when the number is large their proportion declines. Consequently, there exists
a stable, steady-state equilibrium proportion of heuristic traders.

One benefit of

our evolutionary dynamic, and the associated steady-state equilibrium, is that it is
amenable to comparative static analysis.
With respect to the relation between public disclosure and heuristic trade, we
show that improving the quality of public disclosure reduces the viability of heuristic
trade. Specifically, we show that improving the quality of public disclosure causes the
difference between the ex pected utilities of a heuristic and Bayesian trader to decline.
This static equilibrium result, combined with our evolutionary dynamic, implies tha t
heuristic traders comprise a smaller proportion of informed traders in the steady-state
equilibrium. As a consequence, our model suggests that heuristic trading behavior is
more likely to be observed in markets where public disclosure is poor.
With respect to previously established relations between disclosure levels and observable market characteristics, we show tha t heuristic trade weakens, but does not
generally undo, these rela tions. For example, prior models with only Bayesian informed trade demonstrate that improving the quality of disclosure leads to more
liquid markets, more efficient prices, and a greater price variance. These results arise
'1 Kyle and Wang [1996] do not under take any evolutionary analysis. Palomino [1996] considers an
evolutionary dynamic based upon risk a dj usted r et urn realizations. \\lhile Palomino's choice of a
dyn amic is consistent with m uch of the literature in evolutionary economics, it s~>ems inconsistent
with his critique of De Long, et al. [1990], which sug;g;ests that viability should be a function of
exp ected utility as opposed to return realizations .
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beca use public disclosure reduces the informa tion asy mmetry in the market by increasing the a mount of public information. Heuristic trade weakens results relating
public disclosure to m arket liquidity and price efficiency, but does not overturn them.
The result relating public d isclosure t o price variance, however, is overturned. To
understand why these results a re weakened or overturned, note first that market liquidity, market efficiency, and price variability are positively affected by the level of
heuristic trade in some (market liquidity) or a ll (ma rket efficiency and price va riability) cases. This positive relation arises because heuristic trade makes aggregate
d emand more infor ma tive. Improved public disclosure, however, reduces the level
heurist ic trade. Thus, the reduction in the level of heuristic trade resulting from improved public disclosure militates against the force identified in prior models without
heurist ic t rade. In our analysis of market liquidity and market efficiency, the countervailing force is never sufficient to surmount the force identified in the prior models.
In contrast, the result for price variability is overturned because the countervailing
force does more tha n compensate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
present a static model of trade in which the proportion of infor med, heuristic traders
is exogenously fixed. In section 3 we endogenize the proportion of heuristic traders by
introducing a simple evolutionary dy namic, and t hen derive a steady-state proportion
of heuristic traders consistent with this dynamic. We discuss factors that affect the
proportion of heuristic trade observed in equilibrium in Section 4. In Section G, we
discuss the relation between public disclosure and a variety of market phenomena in
the presence of heuristic trade. We conclude by summarizing our results .

4
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The Static Model

AB discussed earlier, the model we employ is an extension of the K yle [1985] model.
A Kyle model depicts a security market in which market makers do not know the
ex tent to which demands are driven by private information versus liquidity motivated
reasons that have no information content. In addition, it characterizes a setting where
informed traders are aware that their trade can move price (i.e. , traders do not behave
as price takers). The initial model we examine consists of one period, a Bayesian risk
neutral market maker, liquidity traders, and N risk neutral informed traders. Among
these N traders, we assume proportion p are heuristic and a proportion 1 - p are
Bayesian. 5

We will use the results for the static model in this section to endogenize

p in Section 3.

Let

u represent

a firm's uncertain cash flow. At the beginning of the period,

information about the firm's cash flow, :cp, is disclosed to the public, while private
informa tion,

:ci, is revealed to all informed

t raders, where

(1)

(2)

ci is normally distributed with mean 0 a nd variance vi, and Cp is normally distributed
with mean 0 and variance Vp· Common prior beliefs on u are that it is normally
distributed with mean 0 and variance v _G
Note that the public information in our model is simply the private information
plus some noise. This information structure is intended to capture the idea tha t
5 \rVe treat t he number of heuristic traders, N p . as a cont inuo us variable. This permits us t D em ploy
a simple continuous evolutionary dynamic that yields a steady state equilibrium p . If N p is r equired
to be <m integer there m ay no t be a steady sta te equilibrium .
;; \rVithout loss of generality, we have a ssumed means of 0 tD ease n ot a tion .
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informed traders, such as financial analysts who cover a particular firm, have analysis
advantages derived from their expertise or access to other information sources. These
analysis advantages, in turn, allow them to eliminate noise from public disclosure.
Within the context of our model, it follows that improvements in public disclosure
can be interpreted as making information more accessible or more available to the
market.
After the public and private information is received, all traders submit demand
orders to the market maker. Liquidity demand is "noise" in our model: it is assumed
to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance v 1. Alternatively, informed
trader demands are chosen strategically. After receiving the aggregate demand order,
the market maker sets a price conditional upon aggregate demand and the public
information. All orders are then cleared at that price . After trade takes place, the
terminal value is realized and claims are paid.
We model heuristic traders' behavior by assuming their posterior expectations
deviate from true Bayesian expectations in a systematic manner. The posterior expectation of a Bayesian trader, b, is

(3)
Note that :rp has no weight because :ri is a sufficient statistic for :r i, :rp with respect
to

u.

We assume that posterior expectation for a heuristic trader, h, is

where r > 1 represents the response of heuristic traders to the private information.
Note that r > 1 implies that if a Bayesian trader's posterior expectation is greater
(less) than the prior expectation, then a heuristic trader's posterior expectation is
greater (less) than a Bayesian's expectation. Thus, heuristic traders overreact to the

6

new or current information. Our characterization of heuristic trader beliefs is consistent with the findings in the psychology literature that some individuals exhibit

r·epn->.sentativeness (more specifically, the ba.c;e mte fallacy ) and overconfidence: for
examples of this literature see Kahneman, Slovic, and T versky [1982]. The assumption that r > 1 is consistent with the base rate fallacy because it implies heuristic
traders place too much emphasis on their current information and too little on public
information when forming posterior beliefs. It is also consistent with the notion of
overconfidence because the heuristic traders are too confident in their private information?
We assume that market making is a perfectly competitive industry. Conseq uently,
we require that the market maker sets price equal to the conditional ex pectation of
the asset's terminal value, plus an amount to cover the costs of supplying liquidity.
Formally, let D represent the total net demand for firm shares and r > 0 some
exogenous cost of supplying liquidity (e.g., inventory holding costs). The exogenous
cost is a function of the demand orders tha t cannot be crossed, or total net demand,

D. We assume that the price set to execute trades by the ma rket maker, P , equals the
ex pecta tion of the asset's terminal value based on total net demand plus an amount
to cover costs :

(5)
where E[· i·,· ] is the conditional expectations operator. If total net demand is positive,
for example, implying that the market maker must go short, the market maker sets
price higher than the expectation of

u in order to cover

his holding costs. Demand

7 This is not to s ugp;est t hat there are not alternative characteriza tions of heuristic trader beliefs.
An e..xam ple of an alt ern ative characterization is to weight the variances Vi and vJ' by some tunount
less than one. vVe choose o ur characterization because it makes the mathematics facile. Finally.
n ote th at beca use traders are risk neutr al, it is not IK'Cessary to consider how heuristic behavior
afle cts beliefs about the posterior variance of t'l.
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orders are then cleared a t the ma rket maker's price, terminal value is realized, and
claims are settled.8
In the standard Kyle [1985] model, the only driver of trading cost is the information asymmetry between the informed traders and the market maker. All other
drivers of trading cost, such as the order processing and inventory holding costs identified in the empirical literature (see Stoll [1989]) , are assumed away. In our setting,
the elimination of other drivers of trading cost corresponds to c = 0. The benefit of
assuming away other trading costs in the standard model is that it permits a n elegant,
closed-form, linear equilibrium. This clean characterization facilitates the analysis of
the implications of information asymmetry. Unfortunately, when heuristic trade is
introduced into the standard model with c = 0, a linea r equilibrium m ay fail to exist.
Introducing other drivers of trading cost ensures the existence of a linear equilibrium,
which, in turn, facilitates the analysis. An alternative to our approach would be to
assume c = 0, a nd then assume that the parameters of the model are such that a
linear equilibrium exists. With this alternative approach, all of our results continue
to hold. The advantage of our approach is that it allows us to discuss comparative
static results without continua lly qualifying our discussion with the assumption that
an equilibrium exists over the comparative static range. 9
An equilibrium for our model must satisfy the following two criteria .
i) The pricing function must satisfy eqn. (5) given the equilibrium trading strategies
of the informed traders.
'vVe a ssume the market m aker behavL'S in a Bayesian manner. One justification for this assump tion
is that Bayesian behavior is s uperior in perfectly com petitive (i.e. , price-taking) settings.
0 Of course, there are alternative ways to introduce a trading cost that are not associated with the
adverse selection problem. For exam ple, e ach trader could be charged a tran saction cost that is
increasing in hi'i individ ual demand order (e.g., c times the absolute value of his demand order) .
'vVe choose an inventory holdin,!!; cost that is a function of total ne t dem an d beca use it makes the
an alysis considerably m ore facile than alternatives.

6

8

ii) The trading strategy for each informed trader must maximize his expected wealth
given the equilibrium trading strategies of the other informed traders and the equilibrium pricing function.
In the following analysis, we conjecture and then confirm the existence of a unique
linear equilibrium in which price is increasing in total net demand: that is, an equilibrium in which informed traders' demand functions are linear functions of their private
information and the market maker's pricing function is an increasing linear function
of total net demand. Specifically, the conjectured trading strategy of trader n is given
by:

(6)
The ma rket maker's pricing function in our conjectured equilibrium is:

(7)
where D

= 2....:::~= 1 UinXi + frm:rp) + dt

is realized total net demand, dt is the realization

of liquidity demand, and Av and Ap are determined from the requirement that Av D +

Ap:rp

= E [uiD, xp]-

Note that in our conjectured equilibrium price is increasing in

total net demand, which implies that An + r. > 0.
We begin our construction of the linear equilibrium by solving informed trader
m's optimization problem given conjectured demand functions for the other informed
traders of the form in eqn. (6) and a conjectured pricing function of the form in eqn.
(7). Let hand b represent a heuristic and a Bayesian-type trader, respectively. Given
trader -rn's beliefs a bout An, other traders' demand coefficients, the realization :ri , :rp,
and trader m's type j E { h, b} , m 's demand solves

(8)
9

where

(9)
(10)
R = r > 1 if j =hand R = 1 if j = b,

(11)

f\j

Fir/1 =

L

.fin,

(12)

.fpr•.

(13)

rr.-,,,,_,-1

n ·/·rn

and

N

Fpr/1 =

L
n ·::::.:· l

n-:;;.l·m

The trader's optimization p roblem is a strictly concave p rogramming problem. Consequently, the first order condition provides a unique characterization of m 's optimal
d emand function, which is linear in the p rivate and public information: specifically,

_ - Fpr;z(Av + c) - Ap

·f prn -

2(Av + c)

'

(14)

and
Rv~vi

.fim

=

- Fi.,;z(>.v +c)
2(>.D + c)
.

(15)

Eqn. (13) implies that trader m! s demand coefficient on public information is the
same regardless of his type. Eqn. (14) implies that trader m's demand coefficient
on private infor ma tion is greater if rn is a he w ·-istic type because a heuristic trader
places more weight on his private information tha n a Bayesia n trader. These two
observations imply that heuristic traders react more aggressively to their information.
In addition, like the standard Kyle model, rn's demand coefficients are decreasing in
magnitude in the demand coefficients of other traders, and increasing in magnitude
in market liquidity as represented by ""D
, 1+C .
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Before proceeding, it is useful to exploit the demand conditions form to establish
the result that all traders of the same type must have the same demand coefficient
in any linear equilibrium. Note that eqns . (14) and (15) imply that, in a ny linear
equilibrium,

-A
f· p m = (An +P c)

-F

R-1._'
.firn

= /\f)
\ .v +vi
+c -

P

.F:
i,

(16)
(17)

where
N

F
-'f·
-z.-

(18)

~ . tn,

and
N

-' r

Fp-

(19)

~ . pn,

n =cc.l

represent the aggregate demand coefficients of informed traders. It follows from
inspect ion of eqns.

(15) a nd (16) that for any m and m' who are both of type

j E { h, b}, .hn = .fim' a nd fprn = f prn'·

Given this result, we let {fih, f ph} and

{ .fib , f p1,} denote the dem and coefficients for each heurist ic trader and each Bayesian

trader, respectively. We can use the two equations of the form in eqn. (16) and
t he two equations of the form in eqn. (17) to characterize the equilibrium demand
coefficients:

(r + N [r - 1][1- p]) v~tli
.fih =
(1 + N) (An + c)
'

(20)

(1 - N [r - 1]p) v~vi
.fib = ( 1 + N ) (AD + c) '

(21)

.

and

- Ap
fph = .fpb = (1 + N)( An

11

+c)·

(22)

In summary, we have shown that given a linear pricing function, dema nd functions
for each informed trader type a re linear. W ith this result in hand, we next consider
the form of the pricing function given linea r demand functions .
Assuming linear demand functions, the market maker's ex pect ation of

u condi-

tional upon the public information a nd observed total net demand sat isfies

(23)
Eqn. (23) implies a linea r pricing funct ion with the following coefficients:
(24)
and
-FiFpVpV + VtV

Ap =
2

Fi (vpv i

.

+ v pv) + v 1( v + v, + vp)

(25)

The expression for Av has the standard implications. First, assuming that Fi > 0
in equilibrium (which turns out to be the case) , the market is more liquid when the
variability of liquidity trade, Vt , increases. Second, the market is more liq uid when
private information is less precise (i.e., v i is higher).
To prove that our conjectured linear equilibrium ex ists and is unique, we show in
the a ppendix that there exists a unique solution {.fih, .fi1, .fph , .fpb, Fi , F p, Av, .Ap} tha t
satisfies the eight linear equilibriu m conditions captured by eqns. (18) to (22) , (24) ,
and (25). The solution has the characterist ics presented in t he following lemma.
Lemma 1. Flw any (exogenou.c1) pmportion of heuristic tmder·s, there e.r,ists a unique
linear· eqnilibr·inm with pr·ice incnca.c;ing in total net demand that has the fo llo·w ing
proper·ties: Fi > 0, Fp

< 0,

)..D

> 0,, ApE (0, v+u:+vp], .fih > .fi b, .fih > 0, f ph = .fpb < 0 .
12

An interesting implication of Lemma 1 concerns the trading strategies of each
type. Lemma 1 states that heuristic traders always respond more aggressively than
Bayesian traders to private information: that is, they go "longer" on good private
news and "shorter" on bad private news ( .fih > .fib)- This aggressive behavior can
be beneficial to heuristic traders in that it permits them to capture more of the rents
from their private information.
The fact that the heuristic traders take more extreme positions in the same direction as the private news implies that heuristic demand may go in the opposite
direction of Bayesian demand. Specifically, for some realizations of xi , :x;P, a heuristic
trader may be long (short) while a Bayesian trader is short (long). Demands may go
in opposite direction because excessive demand by heuristic traders can result in the
expecta tion of price "overreacting" in the sense that E [F ixi, xp] > ( <) E[ul:ri, :x;p],
even though E [u l:rp]

< (>) E [u lxi, :x;p]- In these cases, it becomes optimal for the

Bayesian traders to take a position contrary to heuristic traders.
To close out our discussion of the static equilibrium, we turn to the role c > 0 plays
in ensuring an equilibrium. Broadly stated, the equilibrium >.. v and Fi in our model
can be characterized as the point at which two functions cross. These two functions
are: the sensitivity of the market maker's expectation to total net demand as a
function of the aggregate demand coefficient on :x;i , >..n(Fi); and the aggregate demand
coefficient on :x;i as a function of the sensitivity of the market maker's expectation to
total net demand, Fi(>..n). From eqn. (24) , the fonner function is characterized by

(26)
Noting that Fi > 0 in any equilibrium in which >..n

+c >

0 , this implies that the

market maker's sensitivity to total net demand is increasing in Fi when Fi is small
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and decreasing in Fi when Fi is a large: that is, Av is unimodal in Fi . Using eqns.
(20) and (21) , the aggregate demand coefficient function can be characterized by

' ) -_
F,·( A[)

N(1

+ [r - 1]p)v

----~~~--~~--~

(>..v + c) (1 + N )(v + vi) ·

(27)

The aggregate demand coefficient on ;r;i is decreasing in the market maker's sensitivity
to t otal net demand: that is, Fi ( Av) becomes smaller as Av increases. Note, however,
that as the proportion of heuristic traders, p, increases, Fi(>..v ) shifts to a larger
number for each unit of Av. The intuition underlying this shift is that heuristic
traders respond more aggressively to the private information for any Av. W hen there
are no heuristic tra ders (i.e., p = 0) Av (Fi) and Fi (>..v) always cross regardless of
c. Thus, in this circumstance, there always exists an equilibrium. However, when

c = 0, the existence of heuristic trade through p may shift Fi(>.. n ) t o a position that
precludes the possibility of >.. D(Fi.) and Fi(>.. n) crossing.
More specifically, when c = 0, a necessary and sufficient condition for Av (Fi) and

Fi (>..D) to cross is:
1 - N (r- 1)p > 0.
Once again, if a ll traders are Bayesian, p

=

(28)

0, then eqn. (28) is always trivially

satisfied. However, when p > 0, an equilibrium exists only in the event that the
number of informed traders, N , is sufficiently small. When c > 0, eqn. (28) is no
longer a necessary condition. Thus, requiring that c > 0 always ensures a linear
equilibrium in which price is increasing in total demand.

3

Steady-State Heuristic Trade

Having characterized an equilibrium for our static model in which the proportion
of heuristic trade is exogenous , we now utilize that static model within a dynamic

14

evolutionary framework to endogenize the extent of heuristic trade. In our discussion
of the trading strategies adopted by each type, we alluded to the potential for heuristic
traders to gain or lose relative to Bayesian traders as a result of their aggressive
behavior. VVhether heuristic traders gain or lose relative to Bayesian traders is a
logical determinant of the viability of heuristic behavior in an evolutionary sense.
Let nh(P) and nb(P) represent the (Bayesian) expected profits , which are also the
expected utilities because all traders are risk neutral, of a heuristic and a Bayesian
trader, respectively. Note that n h(P ) a nd n 6 (p) are functions of the proportion of
heuristic traders , p . To address the viability of heuristic behavior, we consider a
simple continuous evolutionary dynamic that is a function of the d ifference in the
expected profits of each type: nh(P) - n~> (JJ).
Formally, we let the instantaneous change in the proportion of heuristic traders
when the economy is a t state p be defined as

(29)
where

~

is a continuous function,
if nh(P) - n~>(P)

~

0

~

> 0

if nh(P)- nb(P) > 0 and p

< 1,

~

0

if nh(P )- nb(P) > 0 and p

=

~

< 0

if nh(P) - n,,(p)

=

0,

1,

< 0 and p > 0,

and

This evolutionary dynamic captures the idea that, over time, the population of informed traders shifts towards the type that achieves higher expected utility, assuming

15

that such a shift is possible. An interior steady-state equilibrium for this dynamic is
an equilibrium proportion p E: (0, 1) such tha t both types of traders do equally well,

7rh(P)

=

7rb(p). A corner steady-state equilibrium with only heuristic traders has the

property that

11 h

(p = 1) 2::

'lib

(p

=

1). Conversely, a corner steady-state equilibrium

with only Bayesian traders has the property that 7rh(P = 0) :S 7rb (P = 0).
Expected profit is the determinate of viability in our evolutionary dynamic. One
justification for expected profit is that expected utility has been suggested as an appropria te measure of evolutionary fitness in the prior literature (see, e.g. , Palomino
[1996]) , and the two are equivalent in our model with risk-neutra l agents. Another justification arises from considering a setting where each genera tion of informed traders,
whose types are fixed, plays our trading game an infinite number of times . Consistent
with the notion of evolution, the b ehaviors of the next genera tion adapt towards those
behaviors that performed well "on average" in the prior generation. In our model,
"on average" is tantamount to expected profit.
In order to establish the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state, we need
to understand wha t drives the d ifference in expected profits in order to ascertain
how that difference behaves in p. Exploiting the st a tic equilibrium conditions, the
difference in expected profits can be written as
( .\n

+ r: )E [([.fih -

.fib] :Ei

+ [.fph - .fpb]:cp) (fib:Ei + .fpl,:Ep)j (30)

(.\n + r: )cov a riance(dh - db, db)

where dj denotes the demand for a trader of type j .
The reason the difference in ex pected profits hinges on the sign of the covariance
of dh - db and db is as follows. Note that a B ayesian trader has a positive (negative)
demand only in cases where E [ulxi, xp] > ( < ) E [P I:ci, :cp]· If, on average, a heuristic
16

trader goes longer (shorter) tha n the Bayesian trader when the Bayesian trader is long
(short), then one would expect the heuristic trader to have great er expected profits. If
the converse were true, one would ex pect the heuristic trader t o have lower ex pected
profits. The covariance of dh - db and db is a measure of whether , on average, the
heurist ic trader is going longer (shorter) than the Bayesia n trader when the B ayesian
t rader is long (shor t) .
In t he appendix, we show that covar ian ce(dh - db, db ) can equal 0 at only a single
value of p and is st rictly posit ive at p = 0. In addit ion, we show tha t t he covaria nce
of dh - db and db equa ls 0 for a n interior p if N is large and is strictly positive for all
p if N is small. This a nalysis yields our first proposition.

Proposition 1.

TheTe e.riiitii a uniqlJ.e iiteady-iitate eq·u ilibr·i·u m. If the n umber· of

inform,ed tr·aderii, N, iii iiufficiently larqe, both heur·iiitic and B a yesian tr·ader·ii are
obiierved in the iitm,dy-iitate: that iii, the iiteady iitate eq·u ilibr·i-um p , j), satisfies J} E

(0, 1). If the number· of informed tm d er·ii iii iimall, then only heur i.c;tic tr·ader·ii s ur·vive
in the iiteady-iitate: th at iii, p = 1.
Proposition 1 implies that heuristic traders who exhibit behavior consistent wit h
representa tiveness or overconfidence always survive in a n evolutionary sense. Furthermore, if there is a sufficient number of informed traders, Proposit ion 1 implies
that both types of informed traders survive.
An issue of interest is wha t ha ppens t o t he informed traders' expected profits a t
the steady-sta te. An informed Bayesian t rader 's ex pect ed profits a re

(31)
which a re strictly p ositive. Because both trader types have equal expected profits in
t he st eady-sta t e , this implies t ha t the heuristic traders a lso have positive ex pected

17

profits in the steady-state. The source of each trader's ex pected profits, however, differs. Bayesian traders choose demands to yield positive, conditional expected profits
for all xi, :rp states . For some :ri , :rp states, however, the heuristic traders go long
(short) when the Bayesian traders go short (long). Thus, for some :ri, :rp the heuristic
traders earn negative conditional expected profits (i.e. , they ma ke some "bad deals").
Heuristic traders still have positive ex pected profits because for some :ri, :rp they take
bigger positions in the same direction as the Bayesian traders (i.e. , they m a ke enough
on "good deals" to compensate for the losses on "bad deals" ).
In addition to our focus on steady-states, one might also be concerned with some
notion of stability. A common stability condition requires that any perturba tion from
a steady-state is self-correcting in the sense that the evolutionary dynamic leads to
movement back to the steady-state. Our steady-state satisfies such a condition. Recall
that the evolutionary dynamic requires that covarian ce(dh -db , db)

= 0 at the steady-

state p. Because cov arian ce( dh - db , db) is positive for p < p, any negative perturbation
from the steady would be self-correcting in that p would rise to J). Similarly, because

covarian ce(dh -d1, db ) is negative for p > J), any positive perturbation from the steady
would be self correcting in tha t p would fall top.

4

Determinants of the Viability of Heuristic Trade

The simplicity of our model permits us to generate some comparative static results
that highlight how certain exogenous factors affect the viability of heuristic trade, as
measured by J}. We then use these results to discuss the empirical relevance of our
findings.
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4.1

Comparative Static Results

Throughout our discussion of comparative static results , we assume that N is sufficiently large to ensure an interior value for p. The steady-state equilibrium condition
implies that:

(32)

covariance(dh - db , db ) = 0.
The comparative statics that follow are based on this condition.

Because a main focus of this paper is the relation between information and the
presence of heuristic trade, we first consider the relation between the information
structure in our model and the viability of heuristic trade.

As has been pointed

out, heuristic behavior can be a beneficial attribute because the aggressive trade of
heuristic informed traders can earn them a greater proportion of the rents arising
from information asymmetry. Thus, one might expect that improving the quality of
the public information (i.e., reducing the variance of vp) makes heuristic trade less
viable. Corollary 1 confirms this intuition.
Corollary 1. The pmpor·tion of henristic tmder·s S?J.stained in the steady-state, p, 'ts

decreasing in the qv,ality of the pu blic infor·mation:

,!;!
p

> 0.

Extending the intuition underlying Corollary 1 to its limit, one might expect that
heuristic behavior evolves away in cases where the public information is as good as
the private information (vp = 0) . This extension is correct because the presence
of inventory holding costs results in informed heuristic trader's always making "bad
deals" and Bayesian trader's profiting by taking contrarian positions.
We now briefly turn our analysis to the effect of variables that do not pertain to
the information structure. We first present a corollary that summarizes the results
and then discuss the intuition underlying the results.
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Corollary 2. The pmp(wt-ion of heurist-ic tmden; sustained ·in the steady-state, p,

is decreasing in the degree of representativeness or overconfidence, r , decr·easing in
inventory holding costs, c, decr·easing in the var·iance of liquidity trade,
.

fTeasing in the num ber of infor·med traders, N : that zs

EJp
!>-.

ur

Vt ,

and de-

EJp
tip
< 0 , -:;< 0, -::;:::< 0, and
uc
(T(}l

The relation between the degree of representativeness or overconfidence, as formalized by r , and the via bility of heuristic behavior is driven by the fact that heuristic
traders t ake more aggressive trading positions as the degree of representat iveness or
overconfidence rises. Greater aggression, in turn, reduces the expected profits they
earn in :ri , :r p states where they make "good deals" (i.e., states where they have positive conditional expected profits) and magnifies expected losses in :ri, :rp sta t es where
they make "bad deals" (i.e., states where they have negative conditional expected
profits) . Thus, heuristic behavior is likely to become less viable as the degree of
representa tiveness or overconfidence rises.
The relation between inventory holding cost s and the viability of heuristic trade is
driven by similar reasoning. Specifically, because the inventory holding cost reduces
the conditional expected profits in st ates where the heuristic traders ma ke "good
d eals" a nd magnifies the losses in st ates where the heuristic traders make "bad d eals,"
the viability of heuristic trade is reduced by increases in inventory hold ing costs.
The viability of heuristic trade also declines in the variance of liquidity trade. To
see why, note first that, in the imperfect competition setting we consider, heuristic
behavior is viable because it commits heuristic informed traders to act aggressively
on their private information. By acting aggressively, heuristic informed traders drive
out demands by Bayesian informed traders, which, in turn, allows a heuristic trader
Lo (;aplure relaLively more

ren~

Lhan a Bayesian informed Lrader. An in(;rease in Lhe
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varia nce of liquidity trade lessens the effect of informed trade on total net demand,
which , in turn, ma kes price less sensitive to t otal net demand. Because price is less
sensitive to total net demand, the aggressive behavior of the heuristic traders is less
effective at driving down Bayesian demands. Thus , the relative benefit of heurist ic
behavior declines and the proportion of heuristic traders falls.
Finally, we turn to the effect of the number of informed traders on the viability
of heuristic trade. Recall again that heuristic behavior is viable because it commits
heuristic informed traders to act aggressively on their private information which,
in turn, drives out dema nds by Bayesian informed traders and allows the heuristic
traders to capture rela tively more rents. In a setting with perfect competition (i.e.,
price taking behavior), aggressive behavior is not rewarded because it does not affect
the demands of other traders. Noting that traditional oligopoly settings converge
to perfectly competitive settings as the number of participants becomes infinite, it
is logical that the proportion of heuristic informed traders decreases in the number
of informed traders . Indeed, one ca n show that the proportion of heuristic traders
sustained in the steady-sta te approaches zero as the number of informed traders
approaches infinity.

4. 2

Empirical Relevance

At this stage it is useful to step back and discuss the empirical relevance of our
findings . Our comparative static results provide explicit predictions regarding the
extent of heuristic behavior. Direct tests of these predictions , however, are likely to
be difficult beca use doing so would require a good proxy for heuristic trade. We a re
reluct ant to suggest such a proxy.
Nonetheless, our model has some less explicit implications that do pertain t o the
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anomalies literature. In particular, if some of the anomalous empirical findings are
driven by representativeness or overconfidence on the part of some traders, our model
provides implicit predictions regarding the settings where the anomalous behavior
should be most prominent. For example, Ou and Penman [1989] find evidence that
prices overreact to transitory components of earnings . If these findings are driven
by the presence of traders who overreact to their information, then one might expect overreaction to be more pronounced in markets where there are more heuristic
traders. Our model, by suggesting some determinants of heuristic trade, provides
some predictions regarding overreaction: namely, the overreaction to tra nsitory components of earnings should be grea ter in markets or for firms where there is less public
disclosure or less liquidity trade.
Our model's insights also apply to papers in the finance literature that suggest
excess returns can be attained by adopting contrarian investment strategies (i.e.,
buying the winners and selling the losers) .10

Again, if this finding is driven by the

presence of heuristic t raders who overreact, then our model provides some predictions
as to settings where the returns to contrarian investing should be greatest: namely,
the returns should be greatest in markets or for firms where there is less public
disclosure and less liquidity trade.
Of course, there are anomalies that our particular behavioral construct cannot
easily address . One that immedia tely comes to mind is the u nd erreaction of p rices to
public information (see, for example, Bernard and Thomas [1989]) . The framework
for our analysis, however, does provide a useful discipline to those who would attribute
this finding to some sort of heuristic behavior. Specifically, our framework suggests
that there should be some rationale for why the heuristic is economically viable, and
108L>e,

for example , De Bondt 1md T h aler [1985] or Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter [1992].
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there should be predictions regarding the variables that determine the viability of the
heuristic. These variables, in turn, can then be related to the extent of underreaction.

5

Disclosure and Market Phenomena

Three primary areas of interest in models of trade are the link between the quality of
public disclosure and: market liquidity, the variance in the change in price, and the
efficiency of prices. In this section, we discuss how heuristic trade introduces a force
that potentially alters the standard link predicted in prior work.

5.1

Market Liquidity

Traditionally, market liquidity has been measured by the extent to which a unit of
demand moves price. A more liquid market is one in which demand moves price less.
Liquidity is captured in our model by >..1.: +c . Because r.. is exogenous, however, the
endogenous component of liquidity is captured by An.
Because heuristic traders are more aggressive in their trading, one might expect
that total net demand contains more information as the proportion of heuristic traders
increases. A standard model with only Bayesian traders yields the insight that an
increase in the information content of total net demand causes a decrease in liquidity
(i.e. , an increase in Av ). T herefore, a logical conjecture is that price should become
more sensitive to total net demand as the proportion of heuristic traders increases.
However, in the presence of heuristic traders , this conjecture is not generally true: in
some cases liquidity is increasing in p and in others it is decreasing in p.
Recall that An =

,r
P; v pv
.
1< / (v 1,v i+"Vp1J)+v !(v+ vi+ vp )

As shown in the appendix ' the static

equilibrium aggregate demand coefficient, Fi, is increasing in p. Therefore , a n increase
in p affect'S both the numerator and t he denominator through an increa<se in Fi. Thus,
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it is the relative magnitude of the effects on the numerator versus the denominator
that determines the impact of p on An. For any value of p, it is possible to show that,
when non-information costs, c, are sufficiently high, the numerator effect dominates
the denominator effect. This implies that a marginal increase from p results in less
liquid markets. When the converse occurs, the less intuitive outcome results -

a

marginal increase from p yields more liquid markets.
From an intuitive perspective, the positive relation between heuristic trade and
liquidity can be explained as follows. Heuristic traders overreact to their information.
The overreaction causes total net dema nd to convey more information. The market
maker must take out the effect of this overreaction when she computes An. This
implies that An may decn'.ase in the presence of heuristic trade unless the heuristic
traders' overreaction is sufficiently attenuated. One exogenous variable that attenuates heuristic trader behavior is the market maker's inventory holding cost parameter,

c. If heuristic trading behavior is attenuated by a high c, then the market maker increases An in response to more heuristic trade. If cis low, the market maker delTeases

An in response to more heuristic trade. More formally, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.

Ther·e exist values .for· c, c1 and ch > c1, such that An i,'i globally

decreasing in p

-~{ c ::; c1,

An is incr·easing and then decr·easing in p

and An is globally incr·easing in p

~f c

2::

~f c E:

(c1, ch) ,

ch .

An implication drawn from static trading models with only B ayesian informed
traders is that increasing the quality of the public disclosure (i.e. , decreasing vp)
improves market liquidity (i.e., lowers An)Y

This result arises because improved

public disclosure reduces information asymmetry, which makes the price at which
shares are executed less sensitive to the private information impounded in total net
llSc>e, for example, pro position 1 of Kim and Verrecchia [1994] .
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demand. Consequently, the response of price to demand, AD, falls . However, the
presence of endogenous heuristic trade makes the relation between the quality of
public disclosure and market liquidity potentially a mbiguous.
To see why, recall that improving public disclosure reduces the steady-sta te proportion of heuristic traders (see Corollary 1). As we have just discussed, a reduction
in the proportion of heuristic traders may decrease market liquidity (i.e. , increase An).
Consequently, it is conceivable that the reduction in market liquidity arising from a
decline in heuristic trade dominates the effect arising from a reduction in information
asymmetry. This counterintuitive behavior does not a rise in our model, however.
Observation 1. .Mar·ket liqu-idity incr·eases -in the quality of the public info rm,ation

desp-ite the decl-in e in heu.r"'ist-ic tmde: that is,

5.2

dd >..

1Jp

> 0, wher·e :\ is the steady-state

Variance of Price Change

A common varia ble examined by accounting researchers is the variance of price change
around a public announcement. In our model, the expected price is zero. Consequently, the variance of price change is captured by the variance of

P.

Because

heuristic traders trade more aggressively, an increase in heuristic trade is likely to
increase the information content of total net demand. Consequently, we ex pect tha t
price changes are more significant as the proportion of heuristic traders increases .
Corollary 4 confirms this intuition.
Corollary 4. The var-iance of the pri ce change incr·eases as the pmportion of heu.rist·ic
.
.
trader·s mcr·ea.'les:
that zs,

dV ar !F'l
· ·
1
<P

> 0.

The conventional wisdom in the theoretical literature is that the variance of price
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change increases in the quality of disclosure. 12

The intuition underlying this re-

sult is that the higher the quality, the more disclosure moves market expectations.
Consequently, as the market responds to the announcement, prices shift more dramatically. In rational models of trade where informed demand occurs concurrently
with disclosure, this result continues to hold even though the existence of informed
trade gives rise to a countervailing force. Specifically, as the quality of the disclosure
increases, the magnitude of equilibrium informed demand decreases, which, in turn,
implies less information is conveyed to the market through total net demand. The
decline in information in total net demand, however, is dominated by the increase in
information through public disclosure. Therefore, the variance in the price change
continues to increase in the quality of the public disclosure.

If the proportion of heuristic trade is exogenously fixed in our model, the conventional wisdom also holds for our model: specifically, the variance of P decreases in
Vp ·

However, when heuristic trade is endogenous, the variance of the price change

decreases in the quality of disclosure. The explanation for a result of this type is
that improved public disclosure decreases the proportion of heuristic traders in the
steady-state, which dampens informed demand. This dampening of informed demand
implies that the total net demand carries significantly less information. Therefore,
despite the infusion of information that arises directly from public disclosure, pnce
change is less dramatic. In summary, we have the following observation. l :l
12St,>e, for example, the discussion in Holtha usen a nd Verrecchia [1988].
13Kin1 and Verrecchia [1994] have a sin1ilar result. In their m odel, the number of infor med traders
en dogeno us, an d t hey show that the variance of the price change is decrea..c;ing in the q uality of
the p ublic inform ation . The reason for their result is that better p ublic information reduces the
incentives for informa tion acquisition , which, in tur n, results in fewer informed tr aders in equilibrium.
Fewer inform ed traders dam pen s in formed demand. T his leads to less infor mation bein g conveyed t.o
the m arket. In shor t. the Kin1 and Verrecchia [1994] result is attributable t o an endogeno us num ber
of informed traders while o urs is driven by an endogenous propor tion of heuristic traders.
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Observation 2. The va1·iance of the change in price decr·eases in the quality of th e
publ·ic information: that is, dv;[Pj
> 0, where V ar [F] is the steady-state value for
Vp
V ar [F ].

5.3

Price Efficiency

A final area of interest to be considered is the extent to which price reflects information, both public and priva te. We exa mine efficiency within the context of our
model by considering the difference between the posterior variance of

u conditional

upon price, P, verses all public and private information, :ci, :c p: V arian ce [uiP] V ariance[ul :ci , xp]As Kyle and Wang [1996] have observed, heuristic traders react more aggressively,
which, in turn, implies that more private information is revealed as the proportion of
heuristic traders increases, ceter·i.c; par·ibus. This result holds in our model as well.
Corollary 5.

P rices becom e m ore infor·mation ally efficient as the p m por·tion

· tiZC
· t,1'ad e1·s zncr·eases:
·
t}/, a,t zs,
·
}~eU1'lx'>

d{V ar [it iP1- Var [itixi ,x pl }
- · · dp ·

(~f

< O.

Because heuristic traders exist in the steady-state equilibrium, Corolla ry 5 implies
that the price is more informationally efficient in the steady-state than in an equilibrium with only Bayesian traders.
A standard implication of static t rading models with only Bayesian informed
traders is tha t increasing the quality of disclosure (i.e., decreasing vp) improves price
efficiency. This result arises because improved disclosure quality is ta nta mount to
providing the market with more information. In contrast to static models with only
Bayesian traders , however, a dynamic model with heuristic traders renders the relation between the quality of public information and price efficiency potentially ambiguous.
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This potential ambiguity arises from the fact that improved disclosure, in addition to providing more information, reduces the steady-state proportion of heuristic
traders (see Corollary 1) . Because Corollary 5 implies that a decrease in heuristic
trade results in less efficient prices , there is an effect on price efficiency tha t counters
the effect arising from more disclosure. Nonetheless , the countervailing effect of less
heuristic trade is dominated by improved public disclosure. In summary, we have the
following observation.
Observation 3. Pr'ice efficiency incr'eases in the qual-ity

l
spite t }w d ee;ine
in }re-ur'istic trad,e: t }w t is,

l~{ the

public inJorm,ation de-

d{V ar [1i! P )-Var [it; x ;,:cp)}
dvp

> 0,

}

- -[ I

·w ~er'e V a.r

u P]

i"c; the steady-state value for' V a.r [uiP].

6

Conclusion

Pnw ions rP.sP.arc.h

h::~~

shown that informffi h P.nr1s t1c. traoP.rs who ovP.rrP.ac.t to c.nrrP.nt

information may do better than informed Bayesian traders. Consequently, heuristic
behavior may be viable in an evolutionary sense. We extend this line of research
by considering how public disclosure affects the proportion of heuristic trade in the
steady-state equilibrium for an evolutiona ry model. We show that improved public
disclosure, by reducing the rents availa ble to informed traders, reduces steady-state
heuristic trade.
We use results developed from our steady-st a te model to reassess the link between
public disclosure and: ma rket liquidity, the variance of t he change in price that accompanies a public announcement, and the efficiency of market prices. In settings
where all informed traders are Bayesian, improved (i.e., more precise) public disclosure is associated with greater market liquidity, increased variance of the cha nge
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in price that accompanies the announcement, a nd more efficient market prices. In
our model, which posits an endogenous level of heuristic trade, there is the possibility that these results could be reversed. This reversion a rises from the fact that
improvements in the quality of public disclosure reduce the proportion of heurist ic
trade, a nd less heuristic trade may be associated with less market liquidity, less price
efficiency, etc. In short, public disclosure in the presence of heuristic traders gives
rise to a force that counters the impact of disclosure identified in models with only
Bayesian traders. This countervailing force ensures that the variance of price change
declines with improved public disclosure. Despite this countervailing force, we show
that improved public d isclosure continues to be positively related to market liquidity
and strong-form efficiency in our model
On a broader level, we acknowledge that introduction of heuristic behaviors could
be exploited to generate a variety of economic responses to information. One contribution of this paper is that first it establishes the viability of a behavior in an
evolutionary sense, and then it considers the impact of the behavior on the link between inform ation and economic outcomes . By adding the discipline imposed by a n
evolutionary construct, we avoid employing heuristics in an ad hoc manner to generate
particular outcomes. As a consequence, the results attained in this paper, a nd others
that ut ilize a similar a pproach, are likely to have a greater degree of plausibility.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1

Using eqns. (18)-(22), (24), and (25) we can write the endogenous variables, fih,

.fih

=

Fi(r + N[r - 1] [1 - p])
N(1 + [r - 1]p )

(A1)

. _ Fi (1 - N [r - 1]p )
f· ' 6 - N ( 1 + [r - 1]p)
f
· ph

= f = _
Flvp(v

· pb

+ vi )N(r -

\

-

P

Fivt(v +vi )
1)p + v1(v +Vi + vp)N (1

+ [r- 1]p)

(A3)

FiVpV
Ftvp(v + vi ) + v1(v +vi + vp)

(A4)

Vtv ( 1 + [r - 1]p)
.
Ftvp(v + vi) (r - 1)p + v1(v + vi + vp) (1 + [r - 1]p)

(A5)

/\l) -

A =

(A2)

')

"

Furthermore, note that eqns. (18) , (20) and (21) imply
F· _

N(1 + [r - 1]IJ) -

' -

( 1 + N ) (AD

1
-)

v+vi

+ c)

.

(A6)

Note also that eqn. (A6) implies that Fi > 0 in any linear equilibrium in which

An + c > 0. Because all the endogenous variables can be expressed as functions of

Fi and Fi > 0 in any equilibrium, the proof can be completed by showing that there
exists a unique equilibrium Fi > 0. Using eqn. (A4) to substitute in for AIJ in eqn.
(A6) and rearranging yields the following equilibrium condition for Fi:

For convenience, denote the function on the left and side of eqn . (A7) as .J. If Fi = 0,

J < 0, and as Fi

----> ()() ,

J

----> ()() .

Therefore, there exists an interior equilibrium
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Fi > 0. To show that the equilibrium is unique, one must show that

J is increasing

in Fi at any Fi which satisfies eqn. (A7). Differentiating J with respect to

Fi yields

2

3Fi c( 1 + N )vp(v + vi?+ 2Fi (1- [r - 1]Np) vpv (v + vi)

(A8)

+ c(1 + N )vt (v + vi + vp)(v + vi) ·
If 1 - (r - 1)Np

1-(r-1)N p

> 0, then

.

,~/, is clearly strictly positive. We show that

gj;,.. > 0 if

< 0 by cont radiction. Assume 1-(r -1)Np < 0 and ,~j{; < 0 at an Fi > 0

that solves eqn. (A7). If gj;,. < 0, then 3Flc(1 + N)vp(v+vi) 2 + 2Fi(1- [r -1] N p )vpv(v+
•
vi) < 0 by eqn. (A8). If 3Fl c( 1 + N )vp(v + vi )2 + 2Fi(1- [r - 1] N p)vpv (v + vi) < 0,
eqn. (A7) is satisfied at Fi if and only if Fic(1 + N )vt(v +vi + vp)(v +vi ) - N [1 + (r1)p]vtv (v +vi + vp) > 0. Therefore, Fi > ~i~~~Cv~~i~ · We can rewrite eqn. (A8) as
Fivp (v

+ vi) [3Fic(1 + N )(v +vi)

+2(1- [r - l ]N p )v] + c(l + N )vt(v +vi + vp)(v + vi)·

(A9)

Notethateqn. (A9) implies that , if3Fic(1+N)(v+vi) +2 (1-[r-1]N p )v >0, then
,~/.;

>

0. F\trthermore, note that, if 3Fic( 1 + N ) (v + vi) + 2( 1 - [r - 1] N p )v

> 0 at any

Fi > 0, it follows that it is strictly positive for all Ff > Fi. Therefore, it follows that,
if

.

gj{, > 0 at any Fi > 0, then gj;,.' > 0 for all Ff > Fi.

We complete the contradiction

write eqn. (A9) as

T herefore %i~ > 0 at the Fi which satisfies eqn. (A7) if 1- (r - 1)Np

< 0. Q.E .D.

The following two lemmas are used in the proof of Proposition 1. We will let a

"A" over a variable denote the static equilibrium value for that variable which is a
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function of pas well as the other exogenous variables (e.g., .fti is the static equilibrium

Fi which is a function of p. ).
Lemma Al. The static equilibrium Fi , Fi , is increasing in p: 4i:l
dp > 0.
Proof of Lemma Al
Using the static equilibrium condition provided by eqn. (A7) to perform standard
comparative statics analysis yields:
n.r

A

dFi
- ap
dp - {)J

(All)

.

{}fi

Recalling tha t the d enominator is strictly positive, the sign of the numerator is the

.

sign of ':f~i The numerator can be written as
-8J
8p

= Ft(r A

')

1 Nvpv (v + vi
)

)

+

(

r - 1 N v 1v (v + vi + vP
)

)

> 0.

(A12)

There£ore ill
dp > 0 . QED
. . .
Lemma A2. The st a tic equilibrium Fi , Fi , is increasing inN:

1{f; > 0.

Proof of Lemma A2
Using the static equilibrium condition provided by eqn. (A7) to perform sta ndard
comparative statics analysis yields:
{)J
-

{):V

------aT·
dN
rw

(A13)

'

Recalling that the denomina tor is strictly positive, the sign of the numerator is the
sign of

*.

The numerator can be written as

8J

- Fj\ ::vp(v + vs~ +

8N

f:Nr -

1)pvpv (v + Vi)

- FiCVt (v + Vi + vp)(v +Vi ) + [1 + (r - 1)p] vtv(v + Vi + vp)- (A14)
Exploiting the static equilibrium condition for Fi, J = 0, yields
8J
1
- DN = N(Fi cvp[v + vi] ~+ ~~vpv [v + vi] + Ficvt[v + vi + vp][v + vi]) > 0.
A 'l

')

A.' )

A
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(A15)

Therefore :~~~~ > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1

Using a variety of equilibrium conditions we can show that covar iance(dh- db, d 6 )
is proportional to K, where

K

= - (Fi3 c[1 + N ]vp [v

+ vS 2

+ Fic[1 + N ]vt[v + vi + vp][v + vi])(r- 1)p + vpv1v( 1 + [r- 1]p), (A16)
and Fi is the static equilibrium value given p . The proof of the proposition is completed by first showing that K > 0 a t p = 0 and ';t~

N,

proof by showing that there exists an N ,

::; 0 if K ::; 0. We complete the

such that K 2:: 0 at p = 1 if a nd only if

N ::; N . Note first tha t at p = 0, K = VpVtV > 0. Thus p = 0 is never a steady-state
equilibrium value. Differentiating K with respect to p yields
dK
dp

- (.f: c[1 + N ]vp[v + vJ
3

2

+Fic[1 + N ]vt[v +Vi + vp][v + vi]) (r - 1) + VpVtv (r - 1)
dFi
dp

~ ,,

- -(3Ftc[1 + N ]vp[v

,,

+vi]~ +

c[1 + N ]vt[v + vi + vp][v + vi])(r- 1)p.

(A17)

Assuming K ::; 0 implies that
(~3 c [1 + N ]vp[v + vi ]2 + ftic[1 + N ]vt[v +vi + vp][v + vi])(r - 1)
1

2:: - VpVtV(1 + [r - 11p).
p

It follows from eqns. (A17) and (A18) that

33

(A18)

Thus , ~~~ :::; 0 if K:::; 0. Finally, fix p = 1. At N = 0, K > 0 because Fi = 0, and as
N ~

00,

that :; ~

K ~ - oo because Fi > 0 if N > 0. Because :~~ > 0 for all N , it follows

< 0 for all N when p is fixed at 1. Thus, there exists an N , N , such that

K ~ 0 for all N :::;

for all N :::;

N when p = 1. Thus, p = 1 is the unique steady-state equilibrium

N , a nd the

unique steady-state p E (0, 1) if N

> N . Q.E.D.

For the remainder of the analysis, we assume that the steady-state is in the interior. We denote the interior steady-state values with a "- " over the varia ble. Note
-

~

that Fi equals Fi only when p = p.
The following lemma is used to prove Corollary 1.
Lemma A3. The static equilibrium Fi , Fi, is decreasing in vp:

t, < 0.

Proof of Lemma A3

Using the static equilibrium condition given by eqn. (A 7) to perform standard
comparative statics analysis yields:
(A20)
Recalling tha t the denominator is strictly positive, the sign of the numerator is the
1''- . The numerator can be written as
sign of (-1Jp
!b..z.
1

(A21)
Exploiting the static equilibrium condition for Fi, J = 0 at Fi, allows eqn. (A21) to
be rewritten as
8J

-~
u Vp

~

ex Fic[1 + N][v +vi] - N (1 + [r - 1]p)v.

(A22)

Thus, the sign of Fic( 1 + N)(v + vi) - N (1 + [r - 1]p )v determines the sign of :;~ .
We show that Fic( 1 + N)(v + vi) - N (1 +
34

lr -

1jp)v < 0 by showing that J > 0 at

the value for Fi that sets Fic(1 + N)(v +vi )- N(1 + [r - 1]p)v
At Fi

=

P the value

=

0,

P = ~~i~~~~~=;:_:.~ .

3

for J

=

N:~~;t~)1/:r:~r > 0. Therefore, because J is increasing

1

in Fi , Fi < C-;'i~~{;;~!.~
which implies that \.
• ,\V
't L

!!.:' < 0 and =..Lddl:
'· < 0.
:·t

Q.E.D.

1,

VL p

Proof of Corollary 1.
Using standard comparative statics analysis on the steady-state equilibrium conclition, K

=

0, yields:

(A23)
Recall that -

dK
£1
·P

> 0 at j5 so the sign of

is the same as the sign of ('11:'VK

di>

£1:Vp

1J

• dK

dv p

satisfies

Exploiting the steady-state equilibrium condition, K = 0, allows eqn. (A24) to be
rewritten as:

dK
dFi
-d = --d [3Ft c(1 + N)vp(v +vi )
A

Vp

')

Vp

1
+c(1 + N)vt(v +vi + vp)(v +vi)] (r -1 )p + -Fic(1 + N )vt (v + vi)~ (r -1)j:J > 0 (A25)
A

')

Vp

because Lemma A 3 implies (d1.1Jp
h < 0. Therefore,

df5

( 1:t.'1J

> 0. Q.E.D.

The following lemmas are used to prove Corollary 2.

Lemma A4. At the interior steady-state p, j5 E (0, 1) , [1- N (r- 1)z1] > 0.
Proof of Lemma A4.
Using the equilibrium conditions we can show that covariance(dh - db , db) is proportional to ( 1 - [r- 1]N p) v~vi

-

>-p.

Noting that Ap > 0 for all p and that the steady-

state condition requires (1 - [r -1]Nf5) v_;}i

-

~P = 0, if follows that (1- [r -1]Np)

Q.E.D.

Lemma A5. The static equilibrium Fi, Fi , is increasing in r: ~ > 0.
35

> 0.

Proof of Lemma A5

Using the equilibrium condition provided by eqn. (A7) to perform standard compara tive statics analysis yields:
(A26)
Recalling tha t the denominator is strictly positive, the sign of the numerator is the
sign of _ #;l
_ The numerator can be written as:
dr
(A27)
There£ore #:1
dr > 0 . QED
. . .
Proof of Corollary 2.

Using st andard comparative statics analysis on the steady-state equilibrium con.

d

clition, K = 0 ytelds· ...E. =
·

dr

dK
dr

d

...E. =

~'
de
ap

dK
de

- #i.'
ap

r

..:.12. =
d1:1

dr:

d~ 1
~
'
a1'

and

r

d~

dN

~a J'

~ =

dN

Recall

that - '~1~ > 0 at j) so the sign of ::~ is t he same as the sign of ';1~ for variable z. '~~
satisfies:

(A28)
Exploiting the steady-state equilibrium condition, K

= 0, allows eqn. (A30) to be

rewritten as:

V pVt V

--- < 0
r - 1

beca use ill
dr > 0.

dK

de

satisfies:
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(A29)

*

Doing standard compara tive statics analysis, we can use the static equilibrium condition, eqn. (A7) , to derive ~ - We then substitute in for

in eqn. (A32) and

simplify to obtain:

dK
ex -(1 - [r - 1]Np) < 0

(A31)

de

because (1 -

rr- 11Np) > 0 by Lemma A4.
dFi

A'>

~~ satisfies:

,,

--d (3Ft c[1 + N ]vp [v +vi] ~ + c[1 + N] vt[v +Vi + vp][v + vi]) (r - 1)p
Vt
-.ftic[1 + N ][v +vi + vp][v + vi] (r - 1)p + vpv(1 + [r- 1]p).
(A32)
Exploiting the equilibrium condition K = 0 allows eqn. (A32) to be rewritten as:

dF·

A,,

--~ (3Ftc[1 +

dvt

,,

N]vp[v + vi]w + c[1 + N][v + vi + vp][v + vi]) (r - 1)p

+..!_Fi3 r;[1 + N ]vp [v + vJ \ r - 1)p.
Vt

*·

(A33)

Doing standard compara tive statics analysis, we can use the static equilibrium condition, eqn. (A7), to derive

We then substitute in for

#(;;

in eqn. (A33) and

simplify to obtain:

dK
ex -(1 - [r - 1]Np) < 0
dvt

(A34)

because (1 - [r - 1]Np) > 0 by Lemma A4. ~~ satisfies:

dK

dFi

A,,

l

..,

dN = - dN (3Ftc[1 + N ]vp [v + vi]w+ c[1 + N ]vt[v + vi + vp][v + vi )(r - 1)p
- (~3 cvp [v + vif + Ficvt[v + Vi + vp][v + vi]) (r - 1)p < 0

because

'1ft > 0 by Lemma A2. Q.E.D.
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(A35)

Proof of Corollary 3.

Using eqn. (A4) , the change in the static equilibrium AD,

5.n, arising

from a

change in p is

(A36)
Because Lemma A1 implies that ~:; > 0, d,;~) is of the same sign as v1(v +vi+ vp )-

!!Jt > 0, it follows that if d,~;7 = 0 at some p, then d;p > 0 for

i:?vp(v + vi)- Because
p

< p a nd

d5.t D
<-P

2

< 0 for

p

> p. The proof is completed by deriving conditions under

which Vt (v + vi + vp) - f ?vp(v + vi ) :::; 0 at p = 0, and vt (v + vi + vp) - F/' vp(v + vi) 2: 0
at p

=

1. If Vt(v + Vi + vp) - F/'vp(v
1'1 rv+ 1•·+1• )
· '
·• ·p .

Fi =

Vp ( -tJ+'t'i )

a nd

]J =

+ vi) :::; 0 at p = 0, it must be the case that at

· J at
0' J <
0. Evaluatmg
-

vlrr +v+v1 )
' ·
'
'·
t'p(t+vi)

. lds
w h en p = 0 yte

(A37)
which is weakly negative if and only if

(N - 1)vpv
r:::; rt = 2(1 + N ) Jv1vp(v + vi)(v + vi + vp)

(A38)
1JJ(t•+ vi+vp)
Vp (1:+1:; )

and p

=

1, J:::; 0. E valuating J a t

which is weakly positive if and only if
(A40)

A

A

Therefore, An is globally decreasing in p if r:::; r1, An is increasing and then decreasing
in p if r E: (rt, rh) , and

5.Dis globally increasing in p
38

if r 2: rh· Q.E.D.

Proof of Observation 1.

Using eqn. (A4) we can write the steady state value for >..n, "5.. 1y, as
(A41)
where

Pi

denotes the steady state equilibrium value for Fi (i.e. ,

Pi = Fi

where

Fi

is evaluated at p). Total differentiation of the right hand side of eqn. (A41) with
respect to

Vp

yields

(A42)
OK - {}.J OK ) and ( {}.J OK - {}.J OK) are evaluated at the steady state valwhere ( {}.J
<7 p {} F;_
{}Fi <7p
lh1p &p
{}p a -up

ues. Note that ' at the steady state values ' a.J
aK > 0 -a.'. aK > 0 a.J aK < 0 and
,7p tJFi
'
Obi {}p
, &,p ,7p
,
- tJ.J
{}p iaK
}llp

> 0. Therefore , we complete the proof by showing that -

F·v
(v
~ l

+ v·)
a.'. aK
~ {}bi <
7p +

v p v l (v+ v ~· + v p )a.JaK
>OandF:-v
(v + vt· )a.rm~
+P~v
v (v + v t·) a.J
aK > 0. Usingthe
t}up {}p
~ l
<}p tibi
t
p
<}p tJvp

equilibrium conditions, it can be shown that

(A43)
and

> 0.
Q.E.D.
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(A44)

Proof of Corollary 4.

The static equilibrium variance of the price can be ex pressed as
(A45)
where
A

1

:']1

F; v; (v

:)

+vi) ~ +

A

t)

2Ftvpvt(v

•}

+ vi ) ~

+v[(v + vi+ vp)(v +vi) + fr/·v; vt (v + vi)
A

1

t)

t)

A

(A46)

t}

t)

F; v;(v +vi) ~ + 2Ftvpvt(V + vi ) ~

+v[(v + vi + vp)(v +vi) + 2Fi2 v; vt (v + vi) + vpvf (v + vi + vp), (A47)

z2 =

fri (fri +frp )

FiNvtv (v + vi)
= Fi- Fjlr (l + N)vp(v + vi) + Flvpv (v + vi )+ Fir(l + N)vt(v +vi+ vp) (v + vi) '
(A48)
A

2

and
(A49)
It is a straight forward exercise to show tha t Z 1 is increasing in Fi and is not a function

·f

l

]J.

N t th t 1 > -.
. -, N v 11,.(v+1)i_)
because of the
O e
a
Fl c(l+N )vp ('u+ vi ):.l+ J<? t•p1-{v+viJ+Fic(l+N)1!J(v+vi+vp)(t+1JiJ

static equilibrium condition given by eqn. (A7), J = 0. Thus, Z 2 is also increasing
A

A

A

in Fi and is not a function of p . Finally, because Fi > II and II is decreasing in Fi,
it can be shown that .&a is also decreasing in l'i a nd is not a function of p. The proof
is completed by noting that Lemma Al states that fri is increasing in p. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Observation 2.

Using the steady state conditions, the steady state variance of the price can be
expressed as:
2

-Va r P
- - [
· [ ]-

v

( 1 + N) (v

+ vi)

]
(A50)

Thus , to complete the proof we need to show that L =
(

:V [l+~~-llPl )

[1 - (r - 1)NpfvP +

2

is increasing in vP. Differentiating L with respect to

Vp

yields:

dp
+ - (r - 1){2N [1 + (r- 1)p][1- (r - 1)NjJ]Fivpvt}
dvp
dPi [2N~"(r- 1]J
) [1 + (r - 1)p ]''~ Vt (v
--d

+Vi ) .

(A51)

Vp

The first term on the right hand side of eqn. (A51) is clearly positive. We complete
the proof by showing that the last two terms is positive as well. Let NI denote the
sum of the last to terms in ~~~~. We can exploit the equilibrium conditions to show
that
1\1

ex Pir(1 + n)[1 + (r - 1)p]v1{N (r - 1)p(v +vi) - [1 - (r - 1)N p]vp}(3N + 2)
+ {1- [(r -1)JJ]2 }Nv1{N [1 + (r- 1)]v - Fir(1 + N )(v + vi) }.

(A52)

Using the two equilibrium equations, J = 0 [eqn. (A7)] and K = 0 [eqn. (A16)], it is
possible to show that N(r -1)p(v+vi)- [1- (r -1 )Np]vp > 0. The static equilibrium
condition, J = 0, and the steady state equilibrium condition observation in Lemma
A4 that [1- (r -1)NJJ] > 0 imply that N [1 + (r- 1)]v - /ir(1 + N )(v +vi ) > 0 and

1 - [(r - 1)pj2 > 0 respectively. Thus, the right hand side of eqn. (A52) is strictly
positive. Q.E.D.
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Lemma A5. The static equilibrium Ap, Ap, is decreasing in p:

d5..1,
dp

< 0.

Proof of Lemma A5
Using the static equilibrium condition for >.P given by eqn. (A5) yields

dP';
beca use, by Lemma Al, l.lP
> 0. Q.E.D.

Proof of Corollary 5.
Note that the unconditional variance of

u conditioned upon X i, Xp

is

t::;.i. Thus

the cha nge in efficiency is solely a function of the change in the static equilibrium
varia nce of u conditioned upon P:
_ f
V a.r [u- IP] = v- Cov [u,P
Var [P]

(A54)

2

The proof proceeds by showing that o:,.~'[~l is increasing in p. We can use the static
equilibrium conditions to show that

Cov[u, .Pp
Var [P]
(A55)

In order to show that

0 <»;}[u_.i:J2
l-· arlf-'i

is increasing in p, we show that

5..,, .
.
>..1, (v+ vi)+N(1+ [r- 1jp)v

- .~. ~~:;1 ~~~- lltl , : . . are both decreasing in p . Noting that Lemma A5 implies

and

5..

that

~P

pF,,1.+1.,_ + N , 1+ ,r-1;P.1F, 1.

is decreasing in p it follows directly that

p. We can rewrite . .

N(l+[r- 1 )~) .

.

Ap Fi (v + vi )+ N (1+ tr - 1iP) Fi 1}

N( l

5..1' Cv+vi)+:~'cl+[r-

Jp) }
1 1

is decreasing in

as follows:

+ [r - l ]p)

vE
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(A56)

h

'l

where E = F;_ r ( l

,,

+ N)vp(v +vi )~+ Ft vpv (v +vi) + Fir( l + N)vt(v + vi + vp )(v + vi) ·
h

,,

h

Differentiation of F;vzv(t,:~i)+P; E with respect to Fi yields
h1

-[Fi r ( l

?
+ N)vp (v + vi)~+
Ftvpv(v + vi)
h ?

+ Fir(l + N )vt(v + vi + vp) (v +vi)]
[F:2vpv(v + vi )N (r - l)p + v 1v(v + vi+ vp) (l + [r - l ]p)]
h'l

3

h·?

?

?

+ 2Fi· r( l + N )vpvtv (v + vi ) + F'tvpvtv~ (v + vi)~

-~3 r(l + N )vpvtv(v + vi)3 [vp + (v + vi + vp)(r- l )p]
- Fi2 vpvtv 2 ( v + vi)[vp + (v + vi + vp) (r - 1)p]
-Fir(l

+ N)v;vtv (v + vi) 3

-[frjlr(l + N)vpvtv (v + vi? + Fi2 vpv(v + vi )][Fi3 vpv(v + vi)N(-r - l )p]
-Fir(l

+ N )vtv (v + vi+ vp) (v + vi )

[vt(v +Vi + vp)(l + [r - l]p) - Fivp(v + vi) (l- [r- l ]p)]

< 0

(A57)

beca use v1(v + vi + vp)( l + [r- l]p) - Fivp(v + vi) (l - [r - l]p) > 0 by the static
equilibrium condition given by eqn. (A7) , J = 0 . Noting that the t erm on the right
hand side of eqn. (A56) is not d irectly a function of p and tha t fri is increasing in p by
N (l+ [~- l).p) . .
ApF; (tJ+ v; )+ N ( l+[r-l ;p)F;v

Lemma A l it follows from eqn. (A57) that . .
'

is decreasing in p . Therefore,

c;::!:tJr

= F;v1v('1.+
-,
vE
,, .
v ;)+ l•;B

is increasing in p which implies that V a.r [u iP]

is decreasing in p . Q.E.D.
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Proof of Observation 3.

Note that the steady state unconditional variance of u conditioned upon :ri, :rp is
v~;,; .

Thus the change in efficiency is solely a function of the change in the steady

state variance of u conditioned upon P:

-

-

V a.r[ui P ] = v -

Cov [u,P f
Va.r [P ]

(A58)

The steady state value for the covariance satisfies

,,
Cov[u, P] = - -

--

-

v~

v +vi

(A59)

which implies that the change in steady state price efficiency due to a change in
vP

has the opposite sign of dv;[PJ.
From the proof of Observation 2 we know that
1.}p

> 0. Q.E.D.

44

References

Bernard, Victor and Jacob Thomas. "Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift: Delayed
Price Response or Risk Premium?" Jo·u mal

l~f

Accounting Resean;h 27 [Supplement

1989]: 1-45.
Chopra, N., J. Lakonishok, and J. Ritter. "Measuring Abnormal Perform ance: Do
Stocks Overreact?" Jour·n,al

(~f

Financial Economics 31 [1992]: 235-268.

De Bondt, Werner, and Richard Thaler. "Does the Stock Market Overreact?" Jom·nal

of Finance 40 [July 1985]: 793-805.
De Long, J. Bradford, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, and Robert J. Waldmann. "Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets ." Joum,al

l~f

Political Economy 98

[August 1990]: 703-738.
Friedman, Milton. "The Case for F lexible Exchange R ates ." In E ssays -in Positive

Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press [1953].
Holthausen, Robert W ., and Robert E. Verrecchia , ''The E ffect of Sequential Information Releases on the Variance of Price Changes in an Intertemporal Multi-Asset
Market." Joumal

l~f

A ccounting Resear-ch 26 [Spring 1988]: 82-106.

Kahneman, D. , P. Slovic, and A. Tversky eds.

Judgement Under· Uncer·tain ty:

Heur·istics and Biases. Cambridge University P ress [1982].
Kim, 0., and Robert E. Verrecchia. "Market Liquidity and Volume around Earnings
Announcements," Jo urnal of Accounting and Economics 17 [1994]: 41-67.
Kyle, Albert S. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading." E conometr·ica 53 [November 1985]: 1315-35.

45

Kyle, Albert S., and F . Albert Wang.

"Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to

Disagree: Can Overconfidence Survive the Market Test?" Duke and Columbia Universities Working Paper [August 1996] .
Ou, Jane and Stephen Penman. "Accounting Measurement, Price-Earnings Ratio,
and the Information Content of Security Prices." Joum,al of Acccmmting Re.'learrh
27 [Supplement 1989]: 111-144.
Palomino, Frederic. "Noise Trading in Small Markets." The Jour·nal of Finance 51
[September 1996] : 1537-1550.
Stoll, Hans R., "Inferring the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: Theory and Empirical Tests." The Jo?J.m,al

(d Finance 44 [March 1989]: 115-134.

46

Table 1: Some Notation

N - the number of risk neutral informed traders
p - the proportion of informed traders who are heuristic

u - firm cash flow, which has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance v
:'i;P = u + ci + Cp - public disclosure about firm cash flow, where:
Ci has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance Vi , a nd
Cp has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance Vp
:ci =

u + Ci - private information about firm cash flow

r > 1 - heuristic traders' response to p riva te information

D - total net demand ord er
d t - liquidity demand, which has a normal distribution with mean 0 and varia nce Vt

c > 0- exogenous cost of supplying liquidity

h - a heuristic-type trader
b - a B ayesian-ty pe trader

P=

(>.v + c)D + Ap:Ep - price at which trades are executed, where:

>.v is the weight the market maker places on total net demand, and
>.P is the weight the market maker places on public information
.fih - the weight a heuristic informed trader places on private information
.fib - the weight a Bayesian informed trader places on private information
.fph = .fpb - the weight all informed traders place on public information

Fi = 2..::~~-.= 1 .fin - the sum of all informed traders' weights on private information
Fp = 2...::::~~ 1 .fpr,- the sum of all informed traders' weight s on public information
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